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Introduction
Recent research shows that the change in CEO before privatization has a bearing on privatization prices. In fact, when taking endogeneity problems into account, López-de-Silanes (1997) shows that replacing the CEO before privatization is linked with a 54 percent increase in the net privatization price in the case of Mexico. Buyers may be willing to pay higher prices for firms whose CEOs have been replaced, as profitability of the firm may have improved due to restructuring before privatization. The new owners may have to do less tweaking with the firm after privatization and may reap benefits relatively faster. This finding is particularly important as CEO replacement before privatization has become a relatively common policy issue in developing countries, and it tends to receive relatively broad political support (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2002a) . Still, taking the findings by López-de-Silanes (1997) at face value, there is still some lack of understanding on the mechanisms by which CEO replacement may affect the productive process of a firm before privatization.
In this note we seek to complement the research by López-de-Silanes, by exploring the two key possible views by which replacement of top management before privatization may impact the productive process of the firm and thus increase privatization prices. The first view is that a change in CEO before privatization sends an unequivocal signal to prospective buyers on the seriousness of the privatization process. This eliminates incentives for corruption on the part of the old management that otherwise, would have tried to maximize rents before the firm is privatized. According to this signaling view, top management replacement before privatization will contribute to the increase in privatization prices once the firm is on sale, regardless of any restructuring done before privatization (Kikeri, 1999) .
On the other hand, according to the restructuring view, the managers of state-owned enterprises are good in terms of political abilities but are not good at actually running firms. The current management has the wrong human capital to face competition and the new market conditions that the firm will soon face once it is privatized. A new chief executive officer, with the appropriate human capital, is thus needed in order to implement all necessary restructuring and run the firm efficiently until privatization takes place (Rosen, 1992; Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova, 1996) . Thus, replacing the chief executive officer before privatization provides the firm with a step forward towards adapting the firm to the forthcoming market conditions before actual transference of ownership to private hands takes place. This, it is believed, helps smooth out the transition of the firm to a competitive market economy.
According to this view, top management replacement before privatization will yield higher privatization prices, as prospective buyers will value the restructuring done before privatization. 1 We build on a recent data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) who collect information on privatization characteristics of state-owned enterprises for firms around the world. We focus on the sub-group of firms from the telecommunications sector. As is well known, until recently this sector has been typically considered among the "jewels" of privatization. Focusing on one single sector allows us to minimize potential problems related with industry heterogeneity. Also, the gathering of additional data necessary for this research is relatively less complicated, as several data sources are available for the case of telecommunications. We are thus able to expand the data set from Chong and López-de-Silanes and further minimize sample bias problems, if any.
2 Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed. Section 3 presents our empirical findings. Finally, the last section concludes.
Data
Our sample is based on a data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) use a survey of Russian shops to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. While they find that the presence of new managers in privatized firms raises the likelihood of restructuring the firm after privatization, they show that keeping old managers but adding equity incentives in such firms do not promote restructuring after privatization. According to these researchers, their findings provide empirical support to the view that management replacement after privatization is crucial in the restructuring process of the firm. 2 Still, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) provide evidence that their sample of firms is unbiased. 3 These researchers prepared a detailed questionnaire addressed to the CEO with a recommendation to direct it to the chief financial officer and the director of human resources of the corresponding firms. They also used additional sources extensively, in particular, documents from multilateral organizations, regulatory agencies, ministries, and international publications (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2002b ). achieve this, we followed a procedure analogous to that in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) .
Thus, we organized a questionnaire in two different areas. The first area covered preprivatization firm characteristics, such as sales, profits, liabilities, CEO change, and the presence of unions. The second area focused on the privatization process, and in particular, on shares sold, the type of sale, and foreign participation. The key explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm changed CEO up to three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise. 4 We complemented our firm-specific information with country-level macroeconomic data, mainly from the World Bank (2001) and Wallsten (2001) . In particular, we used the rate of growth, the rate of inflation, the gross domestic product, and the presence of an independent regulatory agency at the time of CEO replacement, among other measuress. Additionally, we gathered information on economic performance at the firm level from Bloomberg, Economatica, Worldscope, and the International Telecommunications Union (2002). 5 Following related work on the telecommunications literature, three basic outcome measures were collected: change in telephone lines per inhabitant before and after CEO change (penetration), change in telephone lines per employee before and after CEO change (operational efficiency), and change in returns on sales before and after CEO change (profitability). Table 1 presents exact definitions of all the variables used in this paper. 
Evidence
Along the basic lines of the methodology by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) , Table 2 provides empirical evidence on the link between CEO change before privatization and change in economic performance after replacement. The evidence points towards a confirmation of the view that CEO replacement before privatization is associated with firm restructuring, rather than with firm signaling. Not only is the coefficient of our variable of interest positively associated with change in firm performance before privatization, but it is also statistically significant at 1 4 In fact, according to our sample, CEO change before privatization varies widely from region to region. While it has been common in Africa, Latin America, and developed countries, it has been much less used in Asia and Transition Economies. 5 Subscription-based Bloomberg, Economatica, and Worldscope deliver international financial information in a standardized format that facilitates comparisons between companies, countries, regions, and industries. Worldscope, for instance, covers approximately 90 percent of the worlds stock market value and includes records on more than 20,000 active companies representing over 50 emerging and established markets.
percent with respect to change in penetration, and at 5 percent with respect to both change in operating efficiency and change in profitability. In fact, the results suggest that CEO change has a considerable positive impact on changes in performance, as it adds 35 percentage points to mean changes in penetration, 57 percentage points to mean changes in operating efficiency and 7
percentage points to mean changes in profitability. Interestingly, these results are stable to the inclusion of a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of an independent regulatory agency at the time of CEO replacement. The latter is also shown in Table 2 .
Furthermore, according to our results, CEO replacement is the only statistically significant variable that is robustly linked with change in firm economic performance among the privatization characteristics considered in this research. In fact, while foreign participation in the privatization process yields a positive and statistically significant sign with respect to change in firm profitability, it does not have any bearing on either change in penetration or change in operating efficiency. Similar results are obtained in the case of the percentage of shares sold, as such a variable is only statistically significant when associated with change in profitability, but not when linked with change in penetration or change in operating efficiency. Similarly, most of the firm characteristics considered in this paper do not appear to have a bearing on change in economic performance either. For instance, a dummy that accounts for net total liabilities before privatization usually does not yield a statistically significant link with the change in performance variables considered, and when it does, it is at ten percent and with the wrong sign (operating efficiency). On the other hand, average sales before privatization is statistically significant with change in profitability only, while a dummy that accounts for the presence of unions has no bearing on performance change. However, some country-specific variables do appear to have a bearing on change in firm performance. In particular, a dummy that accounts for whether the country has pursued economic reforms yields a positive sign, which is statistically significant at five percent or better with respect to change in penetration and change in profitability. However, such a variable is only weakly significant with respect to change in operating efficiency in the absence of a regulatory agency dummy.
6 Summary statistics for all the variables used are presented in Appendix 1. 7 Moreover, we do not obtain the expected sign.
Conclusions
In a context in which state-owned enterprises still represent a sizable fraction of the world's gross domestic product, investment, and employment (Kikeri, 1999) Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002 ).
Share sold
Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002 ). Independent agency Dummy variable equal to 1 when an independent regulatory agency was established, and 0 otherwise. An independent agency means that the country has a regulatory agency not directly under control of a ministry (Wallsten, 2001 ) .
Firm Characteristics

Penetration
Percentage change between the two-year average of firm lines per 100 inhabitants before CEO change and the two-year average after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001; International Telecommunications Union, 2002) .
Operating eficiency
Percentage change between the two-year average of firm lines per employee before CEO change and the two-year average after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001; International Telecommunications Union, 2002) . Profitability
Change between the two-year average of return on sales before CEO change and the two-year average after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001; International Telecommunications Union, 2002 ; Bloomberg and Economatica). Net total liabilities Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total liabilities are greater than zero up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002 ). Sales
The net present value of the three-year average of firm sales before CEO change. The sales value were denominated in US$ of the initial year (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002 ).
Presence of unions
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had unions or strikes up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002) .
Country-Specific Variables
Economic growth Average rate of growth of the country three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001 ).
Gross domestic product
Gross Domestic Product (US$ PPP) in logs. Average of the three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001 ).
Urban population
Average percentage of urban population three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001 
